It was while I was studying the origins of clinical medicine. I had been planning a study of hospital architecture in the second half of the eighteenth century, when the great movement for the reform of medical institutions was getting under way. I wanted to find out how the medical gaze was institutionalised, how it was effectively inscribed in social space, how the new form of the hospital was at once the effect and the support of a new type of gaze.
In examining the series of different architectural projects which followed the second fire at the Hotel-Dieu in 1772, I noticed how the whole problem of visibility of bodies, individuals and things, under a system of centralised observation, was one of their most constant directing principles. In the case of the hospitals this general problem involves a further difficulty: it was necessary to avoid undue contact, contagion, physical proximity and overcrowding, while at the same time ensuringventilation and circulation of air, at once dividing space up and keeping it open, ensuring a surveillance which would be both global and individualising while at the same time carefully separating the individuals under observation. For some time I thought all these problems were specific to eighteenth-century medicine and its beliefs.
Then while studying the problems of the penal system, I noticed that all the great projects for re-organising the prisons (which date, incidently, from a slightly later period, the first half of the nineteenth century) take up this same theme, but accompanied this time by the almost invariable reference to Bentham. There was scarcely a text or a proposal about the prisons which didn't mention Bentham's 'device' - the 'Panopticon'
The principle was this. A perimeter building in the form of a ring. At the center of this, a tower, pierced by large windows opening on to the inner face of the ring. The outer building is divided into cells each of which traverses the whole thickness of the building. These cells have two windows, one opening on to the inside, facing the windows of the central tower, the other, outer one allowing daylight to pass through the whole cell. All that is then needed is to put an overseer in the tower and place in each of the cells a lunatic, a patient, a convict, or a schoolboy. The back lighting enables one to pick out from the central tower the little captive silhouettes in the ring of cells. In short, the principle of the dungeon is reversed; daylight and the overseer's gaze capture the inmate more effectively than darkness, which afforded after all a sort of protection.
... We are talking about two things here: the gaze and interiorisation. And isn't it basically the problem of the cost of power? In reality power is only exercised at a cost. Obviously, there is an economic cost, and Bentham talks about this. How many overseers will the Panopticon need? How much will the machine then cost to run? But there is also a specifically political cost. If you are too violent, you risk provoking revolts...In contrast to that you have the system of surveillance, which on the contrary involves very little expense. There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze.
An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorisation to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercizing this surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be minimal cost.

Who are these people, and where did they come from. The finders and guardians of this treasure, Houseplant Picture Studio explain:
...To make a medium story almost non-existent, we purchased two hefty photo albums filled-to-the-brim with family photos of a hitherto unknown family. We haven't yet taken the time to look at the back of every photo to try to figure out the family's name. We have noticed that a lot of the photos feature family members standing in orin front of a nice-looking, fully-stocked liquor store. It's quite obvious that the family pictured in the photo albums owned the liquor store. HOWEVER... It's entirely possible that the "unknown family" simply liked having their photos taken in and around the liquor store.

"My role - and that is too emphatic a word - is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed." - Michel Foucault
By James A. DewarThe Rand Corporation
We are in the midst of the "Information Age." Pundits have proclaimed it for years; articles in the popular press have plumbed its implications for every imaginable enterprise;[2] businesses are enamored with it; on-line and print magazines are devoted to it; government is wrestling with it, movies have been made about it; people are talking about it--can there be any doubt?
So, where will it all lead and why should we care? And what exactly is the Information Age anyway?
It is my intent in this paper to describe a way to think about what the Information Age is and where it will lead. And, put succinctly, we should all care because that way of thinking suggests the Information Age is likely to have profound effects throughout society—even if the specific effects are hard to see at this point.
But I'm getting ahead of myself. At this point I want to suggest that it is both important and difficult to see where the information age might lead. Important, not least, because gargantuan fortunes are there to be made for those who see the future clearly. Important also, because information is affecting a wide variety of human enterprises in significant ways (businesses are "flattening" and globalizing; people are buying faxes, cell phones and computers; schools are wiring themselves in anticipation; governments are scrambling to handle information age problems, etc.).
By Sheldon Wolin The Nation (spring 2003)
The war on Iraq has so monopolized public attention as to obscure the regime change taking place in the Homeland. We may have invaded Iraq to bring in democracy and bring down a totalitarian regime, but in the process our own system may be moving closer to the latter and further weakening the former. The change has been intimated by the sudden popularity of two political terms rarely applied earlier to the American political system. "Empire" and "superpower" both suggest that a new system of power, concentrated and expansive, has come into existence and supplanted the old terms. "Empire" and "superpower" accurately symbolize the projection of American power abroad, but for that reason they obscure the internal consequences. Consider how odd it would sound if we were to refer to "the Constitution of the American Empire" or "superpower democracy." The reason they ring false is that "constitution" signifies limitations on power, while "democracy" commonly refers to the active involvement of citizens with their government and the responsiveness of government to its citizens. For their part, "empire" and "superpower" stand for the surpassing of limits and the dwarfing of the citizenry.
By Harvey Cox
The Atlantic (spring 1999)
A few years ago a friend advised me that if
I wanted to know what was going on in the real world, I should read the
business pages. Although my lifelong interest has been in the study of
religion, I am always willing to expand my horizons; so I took the advice,
vaguely fearful that I would have to cope with a new and baffling
vocabulary. Instead I was surprised to discover that most of the concepts
I ran across were quite familiar.
Expecting a terra incognito, I found myself instead in the land of déjÃ
vu. The lexicon of The Wall Street Journal and the business sections of
Time and Newsweek turned out to bear a striking resemblance to Genesis,
the epistle to the Romans, and Saint Augustine's City of God. Behind
descriptions of market reforms, monetary policy, and the convolutions of
the Dow, I gradually made out the pieces of a grand narrative about the
inner meaning of human history, why things had gone wrong, and how to put
them right . Theologians call these myths of origin, legends of the fall,
and doctrines of sin and redemption. But here they were again, and in only
thin disguise: chronicles about the creation of wealth, the seductive
temptations of statism, captivity to faceless economic cycles, and,
ultimately, salvation through the advent of free markets, with a small
dose of ascetic belt tightening along the way, especially for the East
Asian economies.
The East Asians' troubles, votaries argue, derive from their heretical
deviation from free-market orthodoxy-they were practitioners of
"crony capitalism," of "ethnocapitalism," of "statist
capitalism," not of the one true faith. The East Asian financial
panics, the Russian debt repudiations, the Brazilian economic turmoil, and
the U.S. stock market's $1.5 trillion "correction" momentarily
shook belief in the new dispensation. But faith is strengthened by
adversity, and the Market God is emerging renewed from its trial by
financial "contagion." Since the argument from design no longer
proves its existence, it is fast becoming a postmodern deity-believed in
despite the evidence. Alan Greenspan vindicated this tempered faith in
testimony before Congress last October. A leading hedge fund had just lost
billions of dollars, shaking market confidence and precipitating calls for
new federal regulation. Greenspan, usually Delphic in his comments, was
decisive. He believed that regulation would only impede these markets, and
that they should continue to be self-regulated. True faith, Saint Paul
tells us, is the evidence of things unseen.
Soon I began to marvel at just how comprehensive the business theology is.
There were even sacraments to convey salvific power to the lost, a
calendar of entrepreneurial saints, and what theologians call an
"eschatology"-a teaching about the "end of history."
My curiosity was piqued. I began cataloging these strangely familiar
doctrines, and I saw that in fact there lies embedded in the business
pages an entire theology, which is comparable in scope if not in
profundity to that of Thomas Aquinas or Karl Barth. It needed only to be
systematized for a whole new Summa to take place.
At the apex of any theological system, of course, is its doctrine of God.
In the new theology this celestial pinnacle is occupied by The Market,
which I capitalize to signify both the mystery that enshrouds it and the
reverence it inspires in business folk. Different faiths have, of course,
different views of the divine attributes. In Christianity, God has
sometimes been defined as omnipotent (possessing all power), omniscient
(having all knowledge), and omnipresent (existing everywhere). Most
Christian theologies, it is true, hedge a bit. They teach that these
qualities of the divinity are indeed there, but are hidden from human eyes
both by human sin and by the transcendence of the divine itself. In
"light inaccessible" they are, as the old hymn puts it,
"hid from our eyes." Likewise, although The Market, we are
assured, possesses these divine attributes, they are not always completely
evident to mortals but must be trusted and affirmed by faith.
"Further along," as another old gospel song says, "We'll
understand why."
BY HOWARD ZINNNOVEMBER 2001
The images on television were heartbreaking: people on fire leaping to their deaths from a hundred stories up; people in panic racing from the scene in clouds of dust and smoke.
We knew there must be thousands of human beings buried under a mountain of debris. We could only imagine the terror among the passengers of the hijacked planes as they contemplated the crash, the fire, the end. Those scenes horrified and sickened me.
Then our political leaders came on television, and I was horrified and sickened again. They spoke of retaliation, of vengeance, of punishment.
We are at war, they said. And I thought: They have learned nothing, absolutely nothing, from the history of the twentieth century, from a hundred years of retaliation, vengeance, war, a hundred years of terrorism and counterterrorism, of violence met with violence in an unending cycle of stupidity.
We can all feel a terrible anger at whoever, in their insane idea that this would help their cause, killed thousands of innocent people. But what do we do with that anger? Do we react with panic, strike out violently and blindly just to show how tough we are? "We shall make no distinction," the President proclaimed, "between terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists."
Highlights from TRIBES, INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, NETWORKS:
By David F. Ronfeldt, Senior Social Scientist of Rand Corporation
Power and influence appear to be migrating to actors who are skilled at developing multiorganizational networks, and at operating in environments where networks are an appropriate, spreading form of organization. In many realms of society, they are gaining strength relative to other, especially hierarchical forms. Indeed, another key proposition about the information revolution is that it erodes and makes life difficult for traditional hierarchies.
This trend — the rise of network forms of organization — is so strong that, projected into the future, it augurs major transformations in how societies are organized. What forms account for the organization of societies? How have people organized their societies across the ages? The answer may be reduced to four basic forms of organization: 1. the kinship-based tribe, as denoted by the structure of extended families, clans, and other lineage systems. 2. the hierarchical institution, as exemplified by the army, the (Catholic) church, and ultimately the bureaucratic state. 3. competitive-exchange market, as symbolized by merchants and traders responding to forces of supply and demand. 4. and the collaborative network, as found today in the web-like ties among some NGOs devoted to social advocacy.
Incipient versions of all four forms were present in ancient times. But as deliberate, formal organizational designs with philosophical portent, each has gained strength at a different rate and matured in a different historical epoch over the past 5000 years. Tribes developed first,hierarchical institutions next, and competitive markets later. Now collaborative networks appear to be on the rise as the next great form of organization to achieve maturity.
The rise of each form is briefly discussed below, as prelude to assembling the four in a framework—currently called the “TIMN frameworkâ€â€”about the long-range evolution of societies. The persistent argument is that these four forms—and evidently only these —underlie the organization of all societies, and that the historical evolution and increasing complexity of societies has been a function of the ability to use and combine these four forms of governance in what appears to be a natural progression.
While the tribal form initially ruled the overall organization of societies, over time it has come to define the cultural realm in particular, while the state has become the key realm of institutionist principles, and the economy of market principles. Civil society appears to be the realm most affected and strengthened by the rise of the network form, auguring a vast rebalancing of relations among state, market, and civil-society actors around the world.
Before elaborating on this, some definitional issues should be noted. The terms—tribes, institutions, markets, networks—beg for clarification:Today, I spent a little time transferring some of the best posts from my old blog, Netpolitik. In the process, I stumbled on this gem from my second week of blogging. If you've forgotten why you hate George W. Bush, I suggest you take a quick read.
Excerpts by Robert S. McElvaine
History News Network
A recent informal, unscientific survey of historians conducted at my suggestion by George Mason University’s History News Network found that eight in ten historians responding rate the current presidency an overall failure.
Of 415 historians who expressed a view of President Bush’s administration to this point as a success or failure, 338 classified it as a failure and 77 as a success. (Moreover, it seems likely that at least eight of those who said it is a success were being sarcastic, since seven said Bush’s presidency is only the best since Clinton’s and one named Millard Fillmore.) Twelve percent of all the historians who responded rate the current presidency the worst in all of American history, not too far behind the 19 percent who see it at this point as an overall success.
Among the cautions that must be raised about the survey is just what “success†means. Some of the historians rightly pointed out that it would be hard to argue that the Bush presidency has not so far been a political success—or, for that matter that President Bush has not been remarkably successful in achieving his objectives in Congress. But those meanings of success are by no means incompatible with the assessment that the Bush presidency is a disaster. “His presidency has been remarkably successful,†one historian declared, “in its pursuit of disastrous policies.†“I think the Bush administration has been quite successful in achieving its political objectives,†another commented, “which makes it a disaster for us.â€
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